BUCAREY , Víctor

We consider a discrete time, infinite horizon dynamic game of groundwater extraction.A Water Agency charges an extraction cost to water users, and controls the marginal extraction cost so that it depends, not only on the level of groundwater, but also ontotal water extraction (through a parameter n that represents the degree of strategic...

In this work we face the problem of finding strong Stackelberg equilibrium in stochastic games. We study a familiy of stochastic games where equilibrium in stationary policies exist and prove the convergence of value iteration and policy iteration procedures. Preliminary computational results evaluate the performance of these algorithms for...

International audience

In this work we focus on Stackelberg equilibria for discounted stochasticgames. We begin by formalizing the concept of Stationary Strong Stackelberg Equlibrium(SSSE) policies for such games. We provide classes of games where the SSSE exists, andwe prove via counterexamples that SSSE does not exist in the general case. We definesuitable dynamic...

The ISDG12-GTM2019 International Meeting on Game Theory: joint meeting of "12th International ISDG Workshop" and "13th International Conference on Game Theory and Management"

We consider two covering variants of the network design problem. We are given a set of origin/destination pairs, called O/D pairs, and each such O/D pair is covered if there exists a path in the network from the origin to the destination whose length is not larger than a given threshold. In the first problem, called the Maximal Covering Network...