CV2EC: Getting the Best of Both Worlds
- Others:
- Programming securely with cryptography (PROSECCO) ; Inria de Paris ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
- Sûreté du logiciel et Preuves Mathématiques Formalisées (STAMP) ; Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM) ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
- Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy [Bochum] (MPI Security and Privacy)
- Languages de Programmation Sécures et Outils pour la Sécurité (SPLITS) ; Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM) ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
- PQShield
- IEEE
- ANR-22-PECY-0006,SVP,Verification of Security Protocols(2022)
Description
We define and implement CV2EC, a translation from CryptoVerif assumptions on primitives to EasyCrypt games. CryptoVerif and EasyCrypt are two proof tools for mechanizing game-based proofs. While CryptoVerif is primarily suited for verifying security protocols, EasyCrypt has the expressive power for verifying cryptographic primitives and schemes. CV2EC allows us to prove security protocols in CryptoVerif and then use EasyCrypt to prove the assumptions made in CryptoVerif, either directly or by reducing them to lower-level or more standard cryptographic assumptions. We apply this approach to several case studies: we prove the multikey computational and gap Diffie-Hellman assumptions used in CryptoVerif from the standard version of these assumptions; we also prove an n-user security property of authenticated key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), used in the CryptoVerif study of hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE), from the 2-user version. By doing that, we discovered errors in the paper proof of this property, which we reported to the authors who then fixed their proof.
Abstract
International audience
Additional details
- URL
- https://inria.hal.science/hal-04321656
- URN
- urn:oai:HAL:hal-04321656v2
- Origin repository
- UNICA