Masking in Fine-Grained Leakage Models: Construction, Implementation and Verification
- Others:
- Institute IMDEA Software [Madrid]
- Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy [Bochum] (MPI Security and Privacy)
- Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH)
- NXP Semiconductors
- Sûreté du logiciel et Preuves Mathématiques Formalisées (STAMP) ; Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM) ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
- Technische Universität Darmstadt - Technical University of Darmstadt (TU Darmstadt)
- VeriSec project 16KIS0634 from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)
Description
We propose a new approach for building efficient, provably secure, and practically hardened implementations of masked algorithms. Our approach is based on a Domain Specific Language in which users can write efficient assembly implementations and fine-grained leakage models. The latter are then used as a basis for formal verification, allowing for the first time formal guarantees for a broad range of device-specific leakage effects not addressed by prior work. The practical benefits of our approach are demonstrated through a case study of the PRESENT S-Box: we develop a highly optimized and provably secure masked implementation, and show through practical evaluation based on TVLA that our implementation is practically resilient. Our approach significantly narrows the gap between formal verification of masking and practical security.
Abstract
International audience
Additional details
- URL
- https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03528937
- URN
- urn:oai:HAL:hal-03528937v1
- Origin repository
- UNICA