Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute
- Creators
- Bougette, Patrice
- Charlier, Christophe
- Others:
- Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG) ; Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) (UNS) ; COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)
- COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)
- SRM
Description
The paper analyzes the interactions between trade and renewable energy policies based on the EU-China solar panel dispute which is the most significant antidumping (AD) complaint in Europe. We build a price competition duopoly model with differentiated products and intra-industry trade in photovoltaic (PV) equipment. We show that an optimal antidumping duty always increases with the feed-in tariff (FIT) program set in the home country. An appropriate antidumping duty - nullifying the dumping margin - decreases with the FIT program. We show that optimal FIT increases with the AD duty. Therefore, trade and renewable energy optimal policies may complement one another. Lastly, we introduce R\&D activities in the PV sector, and international spillovers. We show that R\&D makes the optimal FIT lower and increases the dumping margin. These effects are reinforced by technological spillovers.
Abstract
International audience
Additional details
- URL
- https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01934117
- URN
- urn:oai:HAL:halshs-01934117v1
- Origin repository
- UNICA