Published May 21, 2012
| Version v1
Conference paper
A Semi-Dynamic Evolutionary Power Control Game
Contributors
Others:
- Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon (LIA) ; Avignon Université (AU)-Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Informatique - CERI
- Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks (MAESTRO) ; Centre Inria d'Université Côte d'Azur (CRISAM) ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
- SMACS Research Group ; Universiteit Gent = Ghent University = Université de Gand (UGENT)
- Robert Bestak
- Lukas Kencl
- Li Erran Li
- Joerg Widmer
- Hao Yin
- TC 6
Description
In this paper, we study a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state. When choosing a higher transmission power, the chances of a successful transmission (in the presence of other interference) increases at the cost of a larger decrease in the energy state of the battery. A central feature in these games is that of the limitation on battery life. Natural questions that arise concern the behavior of mobile users in the presence of interference. How should a mobile user behave given his initial energy state? We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple non dynamic strategies that consist on choosing a given power level that is maintained during the lifetime of the battery. We identify a surprising paradox which we call the Hawk and Dove resource abundance paradox.
Abstract
Part 8: Wireless Networks IIAbstract
International audienceAdditional details
Identifiers
- URL
- https://hal.science/hal-01299776
- URN
- urn:oai:HAL:hal-01299776v1
Origin repository
- Origin repository
- UNICA