Published November 2013
| Version v1
Journal article
Paradoxes in Semi-Dynamic Evolutionary Power Control Game: When Intuition Fools You!
Contributors
Others:
- Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks (MAESTRO) ; Centre Inria d'Université Côte d'Azur (CRISAM) ; Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
- Department of Telecommunications and Information Processing (TELIN/UGent) ; Universiteit Gent = Ghent University = Université de Gand (UGENT)
- Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon (LIA) ; Avignon Université (AU)-Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Informatique - CERI
Description
This paper studies a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state and balances energy conservation and transmission success. When opting for higher transmission power, the chances of a successful transmission in the presence of interference increases at the cost of a larger drop in energy. We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple non-dynamic strategies: a power level is chosen at start-up and maintained during the lifetime of the battery. A thorough analysis of the existence and characterization of the equilibria of this evolutionary Hawk-Dove game is conducted. Moreover, we study the stability of our results under various classes of evolutionary dynamics, including replicator dynamics and Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics and identify various surprising paradoxes. Simulation results validate our theoretical claims.
Abstract
International audienceAdditional details
Identifiers
- URL
- https://inria.hal.science/hal-00913143
- URN
- urn:oai:HAL:hal-00913143v1
Origin repository
- Origin repository
- UNICA