DATAR , Mandar

This thesis presents different novel resource allocation and pricing models for 5G network slicing. First, we devise a flexible sharing mechanism based on a bidding scheme which is provably overbooking-free even though the players' bids are oblivious to infrastructure resources constraints. The proposed scheme can attain desirable fairness and...

Network Slicing is one of the essential concepts that has been introduced in 5G networks design to support demand expressed by next generation services. Network slicing will also bring new business opportunities for service providers (SPs) and virtual network operators, allowing them to run their virtual, independent business operations on...

There is a fast growing demand for mobile telephones. These rely on batteries to provide the power needed for transmission and for reception (up and downlink communications). Considering uplink, we analyse how the characteristics of the battery affect the amount of information that one can draw out from the terminal. We focus in particular on...

In this paper, we present a resource allocation mechanism for network slices. We consider a dynamic resource allocation model with multiple independent resource providers. We call our allocation mechanism, the soft-max allocation mechanism, where the slices bid for resources and the resource providers allocate resources such that their revenue...

We study a Medium Access game modeled as a splittable atomic routing game in a parallel link topology. Each player has to decide how to split her traffic among the links. We take the expected loss probability of a player as her cost and consider various loss scenarios: 1) the M/M/1/1 queue in which an arrival that finds another packet in...

We consider a marketplace in the context of 5G network slicing, where Application Service Providers (ASP), i.e., slice tenants, providing heterogeneous services, are in competition for the access to the virtualized network resource owned by a Network Slice Provider (NSP), who relies on network slicing. We model the interactions between the end...

We consider a marketplace in the context of 5G network slicing, where service providers (SP), i.e., slice tenants, are in competition for the access to the network resource owned by an infrastructure provider who relies on network slicing. We model the interactions between the end-users (followers) and the SPs (leaders) as a Stackelberg game....

Games with Common Coupled Constraints represent manyreal life situations. In these games, if one player fails tosatisfy its constraints common to other players, then theother players are also penalised. Therefore these games canbe viewed as being cooperative in goals related to meetingthe common constraints, and non ...

Network slicing (NS) is a key technology in 5G networks that enables the customization and efficient sharing of network resources to support the diverse requirements of nextgeneration services. This paper proposes a resource allocation scheme for NS based on the Fisher-market model and the Trading-post mechanism. The scheme aims to achieve...

National audience

We consider a peer-to-peer electricity marketmodeled as a network game, where End Users (EUs) minimizetheir cost by computing their demand and generation whilesatisfying a set of local and coupling constraints. Their nominaldemand constitutes sensitive information, that they might wantto keep private. We prove that the network game admits...

We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market modeled as a network game, where End Users (EUs) minimize their cost by computing their demand and generation while satisfying a set of local and coupling constraints. Their nominal demand constitutes sensitive information, that they might want to keep private. We prove that the network game admits...

We consider a network game, where End Users (EUs) minimize their cost by computing their demand and generation while satisfying a set of local and coupling constraints. Their nominal demand constitutes sensitive information, that they might want to keep private. We prove that the network game admits a unique Variational Equilibrium, which...

We consider a peer-to-peer electricity marketmodeled as a private network game, where End Users (EUs)minimize their cost by computing their demand and controllablegeneration. Their nominal demand constitutes sensitiveinformation, that they might want to keep private. We provethat the private network game admits a unique VariationalEquilibrium,...

Network slicing is becoming the platform of choice for several applications and services. Nowadays most applications are virtualized to gain flexibility and portability. With network slicing, operators can create multiple network slices or tenants, which can be used for certain applications with specific requirements. Behind the network...

This paper studies the tradeoff between running cost and processing delay in order to optimally orchestrate multiple fog applications. Fog applications process batches of objects' data along chains of containerised microservice modules, which can run either for free on a local fog server or run in cloud at a cost. Processor sharing techniques,...

Slicing is emerging as a promising technique to support new differentiated services in 5G networks. It provides the necessary flexility and scalability associated with future services. To maintain satisfactory services requirements and high profit for service providers, a slice may be designing according to the varying demands and resource...

Masks save lives. Therefore, whilst the culture of wearing masks is promoted, it is critical to understand the various aspects of how that culture is adopted. The main contribution of this paper is in the modeling of the mask game. Wearing a mask provides partial protection against epidemics at some cost of comfort. Players can be...

We model the competition over several blockchains characterizing multiple cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Then, we specialize our results to two instances of the general game, showing properties of the Nash equilibrium. In particular, leveraging results about congestion games, we establish the existence of pure Nash equilibria and...

We model the competition over mining resources and over several cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Leveraging results about congestion games, we establish conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria and provide efficient algorithms for finding such equilibria.We account for multiple system models, varying according to the way...